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Short Abstract : 
The hole argument is a story invented by Albert Einstein to set out the 
difficulties he had in reconciling his principle of covariance with the Mach’s 
principle. Some modern presentations insist that the bare differential 
manifold loses its physical status and is just an expression of the 
mathematical framework of the new relativistic theory.  
In Space-Time-Matter, Hermann Weyl constructed an argument close to the 
modern hole argument, replacing the hole with a ball of clay. Beside some 
trivial technical differences, Weyl’s argument is original because of the 







Les signes (**********) représentent les moments où il faut changer de 
diapositive Powerpoint) 
(**********) 
I will talk first about the 
Aim of this paper: 
In 1918, Hermann Weyl published Space-Time-Matter, one of the first 
general handbooks on General relativity. Weyl thought with enthusiasm that 
Albert Einstein’s theory is a brilliant confirmation of Bernhard Riemann’s 
epistemological ideas on geometry. That involves a redistribution of the roles 
of mathematics and physics in the scientific constitution of the space 
concept. In a short text from Space-Time-Matter, Weyl explains how this 
redistribution works in a theory like general relativity, that is in a 
Riemannian space where the metrical coefficients are determined by 
matter. For his explanation, he uses an argument very close formally to the 
famous Albert Einstein’s Hole argument. But, in Weyl’s argument, the hole is 
replaced by a ball of clay which is modeled by hand. We will call it the “ball 
of clay argument”. 
(**********) 
We will present two different points of view on the BCA. 
Firstly, we will provide a comparison between Einstein’s Hole Argument and 
Weyl’s BCA. This comparative interpretation will show some differences in 
the mathematical and physical content of the arguments. And that will 
highlight some features of GTR-like theories. 
Secondly, we will propose an intrinsic interpretation of the BCA. That is a 
reading from the point of view of Weyl himself. We will see that the 
excessive simplifications that we meet in Weyl’s expression of Mach’s 
principle can be explained by a difference in the philosophical problems 
guiding both authors. Beyond its formal analogy with the HA, the aim of the 
BCA is different. It presents an important dilemma, which could be the key 
idea in understanding the unity of STM, and therefore, the unity of Weyl’s 
thoughts on the space concept. 
(**********) 
I start by presenting quickly  
Einstein’s presentation and the modern presentation of the hole argument : 
Albert Einstein struggled with both mathematical and conceptual difficulties 
during the years 1907-1915, when he was searching for a relativistic theory 
for gravitation. Einstein wanted his field theory to satisfy two strong 
hypotheses, namely 1) the total determination of the inertia by the 
distribution of matter (Mach’s principle) and 2) the principle of general 
relativity. He thought that the latter had to be expressed by a general 
covariant theory, in the context of a Riemannian metric. There $fore, he was 
looking for tensorial field equations Gab(x) = Tab(x), where Tab(x) is the stress-
energy tensor (representing mass), and Gab(x) is a mathematical function of 
the metrical tensor gab(x) and its derivatives. However, for a while, some of 
his difficulties appeared to suggest that such a general schema couldn’t 
provide a correct expression of Mach’s principle. 
The hole argument, developed by Einstein, was a didactic way to present his 
momentary belief in this incompatibility. 
(**********) 
What Einstein wanted to show, in his hole argument, is that, in every theory 
of the previous kind, there is a kind of indeterminism, in the sense of a 
violation of Mach’s principle. 
In such a theory, we could find, for the same field of stress-energy 
coefficients Tab(x), two different fields of metrical coefficients gab(x) and 
g’ab(x) that both verify the gravitational equations (*). The second field is 
constructed from the first, simply using the fact that the gravitational 
equations (*) are covariant, and using the hypothesis of a region of space 
(the hole) that is void of matter. Einstein concluded first that, if we took 
these kinds of covariant gravitational equations, we had to introduce into 
the physical theory some indeterminism‒something which was 
unacceptable for him. 
 
(**********) 
Let’s focus now on a modern presentation of the argument (we think about 
the interpretation of three Johns: J.Stachel, J.Earman and J.Norton). In their 
interpretation of the hole argument, they minimize the importance of 
Mach’s principle, and so they minimize the importance of the hole itself. 
For them, what is important to understand is that, before we put any field 
on, space-time as a purely topological manifold is not already a physical 
entity. It is just a mathematical frame. 
We just have to understand that two solutions differing only by an active 
diffeomorphism are two mathematical expressions of the same physical 
situation. 
We see that the issue, here, differ from that of the original argument. 
(**********) 
Three notions compose the hole argument: the manifold, the metric and the 
mass (the stress-energy tensor). The modern presentation insists on the 
relation between on one side, the bare manifold, and, on the other side, the 
metrical field and the stress-energy field together. Thus, we focus here on 
the epistemological problem about the relation between the mathematical 
framework and the physical entities.  
In fact, what Einstein really wanted to compare was, on one hand, the 
manifold with the stress-energy tensor defined on it, and on the other hand, 
the metrical tensor. The main problem therefore was to think the relation 
between two physical realities (mass and metric), an ontological problem 
about the nature of the relations between the metric and the masses. 
To solve this original problem, we have to understand that we still have a 
mathematical freedom in the way we express the metric on the manifold, 
even when the values of the stress-energy tensor are given everywhere. 
Let’s turn now to the ball of clay argument. 
(**********) 
Contrary to Einstein and the moderns, Weyl uses excessively simplified 
hypotheses to develop his argument: 
1) He posits that the (differential) space-time manifold is R4 itself 
2) He models the content of space-time (matter and energy) by a single 
scalar function . 
3) He gives Mach’s principle in a very simple form. He states that the 
metric is directly a function of the repartition of matter. 
 
Like in the hole argument, Weyl’s argument is developed in three steps. (we 
change just a little the order inside the argument) We start from a certain 
repartition of matter (x) with a metric gν(x). Then, we change the 
repartition of matter to ’(x). Finally, we change the frame of coordinates in 
such a way that the new repartition of matter is expressed in the new frame 
of coordinates, like the old repartition of matter was expressed in the first 
frame of coordinates. (Then, have  at step 1 and then again  at step 3, the 
same mathematical function). 
Now, we explore two possibilities for the behavior of the metric. 
Possibility a)  
If the metric is independent from matter. Then, at step 2, the metric does 
not change. But, when we change the frame of coordinates, at step 3, we 
change the coefficients of the metric. Therefore, they differ at the end from 
the initial coefficients. Weyl interpret this by saying that matter cannot 
move from one point of Space to another without changing its metrical 
relations. 
Possibility b) 
If the metric is dependant from matter. Then, the metric changes at step 2. 
And when change the frame of coordinates at step 3, then the coefficients 
come back to their first values. We have the same mathematical functions 
gν at the end as at the beginning. Weyl interpret this by saying that matter 
can move from one point of space to another, without changing its metrical 
relations. Space is than homogeneous. We have, in one sense, the possibility 
of a rigid motion. 
What is important for Weyl is to show that, even in a Riemannian context, 
we can think about the possibility of a rigid motion, or of the homogeneity 
of space. In other words, he wants to show that we can move a body from a 
point of space to another, without changing its intrinsic metrical relations.  
Therefore, Weyl concludes that only the case b) is correct. We have to 
suppose that the metric is dependant from matter, if we want to save 
homogeneity of space in a Riemannian context. 
(**********) 
Then, Weyl comes to what we can call properly the “Ball of Clay Paradox”. 
He states that: 
“The simple fact that I can squeeze a ball of modeling clay with my 
hands into any regular shape totally different from a sphere would 
seem or reduce Riemann’s view to absurdity.” 
Space-Time-Matter, §12  
Indeed, Weyl wanted to illustrate the possibility of a rigid motion in a 
Riemannian context. But the conclusion of his argument is not the possibility 
but the necessity of the rigidity of motion. The universe as a whole appears 
in his argument as a unique rigid body where any motion is impossible, even 
the simple possibility to change the shape of a ball of clay. 
Thus, Weyl’s ball of clay paradox is a paradox precisely in the same sense as 
Zeno’s paradoxes. It demonstrates the impossibility of any motion, starting 
just from a few rational hypothesis. 
A new kind of paradox of motion like Zeno’s  
1) If the inner properties of matter can be entirely determined by fields 
whose signification  need not any metric (like scalar fields   
2) And if these inner non-metrical properties of matter entirely determine 
the metric  
Then no motion is possible is the universe (without changing the inner 
properties of matter). 
 
In the text following our quotation, Weyl tries several ways to solve the 
paradox. Nevertheless, we think that these solutions are less interesting 
than the reason why a paradox of motion is implied in Weyl’s ball of clay 
argument, but not in Einstein’s hole argument. 
Indeed, we have a paradox of motion in Weyl’s schema, because of his over 
simplified formulation of Mach’s principle. So, by contrast with Einstein’s 
more subtle schema, it demonstrates that, in order to be compatible with 
the possibility of motion: 
1) Mach’s principle has to be expressed in a Local-Dynamic 
(not a Global-Static) form. We have to take time into account in order 
to express correctly Mach’s principle 
 
2) Mach’s principle cannot link a totally non-spatial concept of matter 
with the metric. Rather, it must link matter, as it is distributed in a 
current metrical web, with the future distribution of matter. Matter 
does not determine the metric but the evolution of the metric. 
(**********) 
Now, we turn to the intrinsic approach to the Ball of Clay argument. 
We saw that the Ball of Clay Argument of Weyl has mathematical and 
physical weaknesses with regards to the hole argument of Einstein, because 
of excessive simplifications. But, beside this, the difference between these 
arguments highlights an important change in the philosophical issues of 
these two authors. 
Weyl simplifies the modeling of matter because, like in modern 
interpretations of the hole argument, his main interest is not the way in 
which matter can entirely determine the metric. For Weyl, this 
determination is no longer a problem but an hypothesis. 
 
Instead of this, Weyl’s problem is now: 
In the context of a Riemannian metrics whose coefficients are 
determined by matter, can we continue to think about geometry as an 
a priori mathematical knowledge about a space characterized by its 
homogeneity? 
We see that Hermann Weyl’s problem is closer to the modern approach of 
the hole argument than to Einstein’s. But his investigation into the link 
between mathematics and physics in geometry is greatly influenced by a 
particular concept of mathematics, which is inherited from the Gottingen 
school. 
(**********) 
To save the homogeneity of space in this Riemannian context, in the text of 
the Ball of Clay Argument, he adopts a radical solution. He excludes the 
notion of metric from the domain of the mathematical geometry, in the 
strict sense. The space, as the homogeneous object of geometry, is reduced 
to the topological (differential) notion of manifold. This idea is closely linked 
to some idea we can find in several Einstein’s texts. We have to wait for the 
third edition of Space-Time-Matter to read about a more subtle solution to 
Weyl’s problem. This more elaborate solution is supplied by the idea of 
“Nahegeometrie” (we refer to the works of Erhard Scholz for this notion) 
The idea is that only the infinitesimally closed relations are the object of an 
a priori knowledge, whereas relations at a finite distance need the 
consideration of matter and so is the object of physics. 
To conclude, we have first highlighted some important features of Mach’s 
principle, by a comparative interpretation of the Ball of Clay argument with 
the hole argument. The, we turned to an intrinsic interpretation of the text 
of the Ball of Clay Argument. And we saw that it can be considered as the 
place, in Space-Time-Matter, where Hermann Weyl puts down the problem 
of the conciliation of Riemannian geometry with the idea of the 
homogeneity of space. That idea of homogeneity was very important for 
Hermann Weyl, because he defended some kind of idealism of space. 
Therefore, the issue presented in the Ball of Clay Argument is the key to 
have a global understanding of the great geometrical works of this author. 
This is the birth of the epistemological problem that has guided Hermann 
Weyl to his Nahegeometrie. 
 
Thank you. 
